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In July 2016 – more than 15 years into his time in office – Vladimir Vladimirovich
Putin’s approval rating was at 82%, a figure made all the more remarkable by
the fact that the country is experiencing a palpable and lengthy economic
downturn. Some commentators have favoured an explanation that treats this as
proof that a larger-than-life president is more in line with ‘what Russians want’,
as Putin “satisfied a yearning for a strong leader who could make the Russian
family proud”. However, concretising a Russian ‘national desire’ is less than
helpful if we seek to understand the reasons behind Putin’s continued popularity.
Equating a historical past with an inherent propensity to follow strong-men is an
exercise in oversimplification, as it treats nations and groups as essentially
static, prone to repeat the same historical patterns over and over again.
Similarly, a focus on the more overt parallels with the earlier ‘Cults of
Personality’ neglects the fact that the underlying ‘conditions of possibility’ that
produced the two phenomena are different. Such comparisons also fail to
explain the appeal of similarly larger-than-life politicians in countries with a
longer democratic tradition. Clearly, an emphasis on national psychological
propensities is not productive. Instead, an analysis of the appeal of such leader
figures that taps into less conscious mechanisms is worthwhile. By
simultaneously looking at the phenomenon of Donald Trump’s remarkable rise, a number of parallels pertaining to
the creation of their public personae become apparent. In fact, such an analysis can serve to illuminate overarching
principles structuring the successful creation of their outsized public personae.
The popular support these politicians attract demonstrates that they hold a kind of libidinal appeal that should not be
underestimated, lest we render a large part, if not the majority, of a country’s population politically incompetent.
While one cannot discount the real inequalities, as well as the real and imagined grievances that opened up the
space for less established political figures to gain support, it is nevertheveless worthwhile to examine why these
particular kinds of candidates hold such appeal. Their reliance on spectacle and well-orchestrated exploits which
combine the hypermasculine with the hyperreal enabled them to set in motion processes of identification that
transcend the need for a coherent, well articulated political agenda. Instead, while seeming unsubtle to the point of
being crass, they simultaneously operate on a more subliminal level, remaining oblique enough to become conduits
for the electorate’s personal hopes and grievances. While this piece centres on the representational mechanisms
employed by Vladimir Putin and his team of PR advisers, it is possible to identify a number of parallels with other
contemporary leader figures – chief among them Donald Trump – each of whom appears to rely on a kind of
hypermasculine charisma to suture a political field that is otherwise characterised by cynicism towards established
politics.
Between hypermasculinity and hyperrealism
Political leaders of the 21st century are now relying on the mobilisation of libidinal energy to gain followers ever more
openly. This is not to deny that the cults of personality of the 20th century did not feature a strong libidinal element.
Now this appeal is no longer merely implicit; it is explicitly written on politicians’ bodies and entails more openly
flirtatious behaviour. In attempts to woo the electorate, the public are positioned as partners in a flirtatious game of
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‘will we / won’t we?’. Candida Yates argues that some – mainly Western – politicians now engage in traditionally
feminine techniques of flirtation, emphasising their ‘metrosexuality’. This is contrasted with the more paternal or
patriarchal figures that dominated the political scene in the past. Concurrently with this first type exist more
‘retrosexual’ forms of masculinity. Examples she provides include Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Vladimir
Putin – all politicians whose public appearances frequently involve machoesque posturing, placing much more
emphasis on physical and sexual prowess. Donald Trump can easily be imagined as joining this peculiar clique.
Political flirtation, too, relies heavily on staged scenarios to achieve its full impact. It therefore serves observers
especially well to pay attention to the fantasies inherent in the media spectacles devised and coordinated by
politicians’ advisers. Indeed, such fantasies are not always of a distinctly sexual nature: they can be interpreted as
representations of the unconscious “wish to identify with narratives of mastery”[1]. Some of the pseudo-events
referred to earlier can even be identified as part of a tradition of entertainment products – the focus here being on
consumption – such as Hollywood films that feature the US President either in danger and being freed by a heroic
renegade, or the President himself becoming integral in efforts to save the country (such as 1996’s Independence
Day and 1997’s Air Force One). The figure of the President then becomes a mere fantasmatic vehicle, representing
masculinity, power, and altruism – a quality that is admired despite or because of the overt cynicism of much of the
discourse on and around politics. In this vein, Putin’s pursuit of physical fitness becomes symbolic of mastery of
the self as much as of sexuality.
At the same time, this more traditional form of masculinity does not preclude the existence and occasional
highlighting of a softer, more family-oriented side. In the case of the Russian president, his actual family has
remained out of the spotlight almost completely, marking a difference to Trump, whose family has become an
integral part of his media campaign and business. However, the virtual public absence of his family makes Putin a
better fit for a more paternal role vis-à-vis the nation, while much media attention is devoted to Putin’s public
displays of affection towards animals, which include him playing with, as well as feeding a series of baby animals.
There are also several incidences of him publicly administering kisses to animals and little children. These kisses
can be read as symbolic acts, serving to cement an image of “Father of the Nation”, albeit as a tender rather than
stern patriarch. An alternative interpretation, however, is that despite the seemingly excessive masculinity of the
presidential persona, it incorporates masculine and feminine aspects. One analyst concludes that for his leadership
style “the best comparison now may be a transgender cross between the former Argentine leader Juan Perón and
his legendary wife, Eva (“Evita”)”. While masculinity is therefore a central facet of the national vision as it is
performed by Vladimir Putin, his ambition to stand for, and speak on behalf of all of Russia cannot neglect the
nation’s ‘maternal characteristics’. In Trump’s case, a seemingly more brazen celebration of masculinity (and
fecundity) seems to manifest. However, some have argued that the prominent role his children, and especially his
daughter play in his campaign and business, is meant to soften his image and detract from his frequent bouts of
misogyny, making her prominent role strategic – after all, how can a man be contemptuous of women if he has such
a close relationship with his daughter?
The President as Spectacle
It is almost forgotten now that the current Russian president was initially perceived to be something of a technocrat,
which was made apparent by his discourse and general demeanour. But by Putin’s second term as President of the
Russian Federation, his administration had displayed a remarkable penchant for newsworthy occasions highlighting
the President’s singular determination and prowess. It is in part Putinism’s ability to orchestrate PR-events that have
secured him so firm a position in the national and international imaginary.
A typology of events featuring the president would demonstrate that all of them aim to highlight a certain skill or
positive facet of his character, often one that falls into the broad category of traditional masculinity (on which more
will be said later on). They usually involve the accomplished handling of a prop, or, perhaps more curiously,
interaction with animals. Their political or strategic necessity is not always immediately apparent, while their staged
nature is either transparently obvious or revealed to be so later on. Past ‘scripted events’ – that is, events that do not
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occur spontaneously and have been planned with the media in mind – include the President singing and playing the
piano at a charity gala, flying a plane to help extinguish the devastating forest fires in the summer of 2010, driving a
Russian-made Lada across Siberia, shooting grey whales with a crossbow, finding a pair of ancient amphorae on a
diving trip in the Black Sea, and catching a pike weighing 21 kg. While it emerged later that on his journey across
Siberia he was in fact accompanied by a large entourage and had changed cars several times, that the amphorae
had been placed there prior to his entering the water, and that the pike’s reported weight may have been grossly
exaggerated, this did not diminish his public standing.
In fact, a blurring of boundaries between reality and entertainment product in what one could broadly delineate as
the arena of political communication, and in many cases a replacement of the former by the latter, is characteristic of
the late 20th and early 21st century. This has led to the creation of numerous ‘pseudo-events’, some of which the
public may no longer discern as such. As is the case with any type of ‘pseudo-event’, its success is “measured by
how widely it is reported…The question, “Is it real?” is less important than “Is it newsworthy ?…Its relation to the
underlying reality of the situation is ambiguous. Its interest arises largely from this very ambiguity….” (Notably,
Richard Waterman’s quote refers to strategies employed by US politicians.) One consequence is the normalisation
of spectacles such as the press conference, or more elaborate events such as Putin’s annual ‘telethon’, during
which he responds to (vetted) questions by the general public, sometimes for a duration of up to 4 hours. The case
of Donald Trump is in many ways an even starker illustration of the power of spectacle, as his forays into television
and film precede his entry into politics. Indeed, through his appearances in films and TV shows – always as
‘himself’, until finally cementing his brand in ‘The Apprentice’, Donald Trump the character was already a household
name long before his move into politics. While the Trump brand’s biggest supporter seems to be Donald Trump
himself, closely followed by his immediate family, Putin himself assumes a somewhat more modest public persona,
instead letting his deeds speak for themselves. At the same time, the amount of Putiniana, or cultural output and
commodities featuring the Russian president – from toothpicks to songs and calendars – is not too far from the
manner the Trump name is used as a trademark, lending it to products such a steaks and cologne and turning a
profit at the same time.
Of course, the transformation of politics into entertainment
products can also generate a greater cynical distance from
politics in general, creating the impression that “in the
entertainment industry when there is a sign it seems there isn’t
one, and when there isn’t one we believe there is”, as Umberto
Eco observes. Symptomatic of this disorientation is the media
speculation that surrounded a walk the President took in St
Petersburg following the funeral of his first judo coach. He
ostensibly wished to spend time alone – without bodyguards or
the press – in his old neighbourhood, but pictures of Putin on
his solitary walk soon flooded the Internet, often accompanied
by the question of whether this was actually staged, perhaps to
imbue Putin with greater emotional depth, which would link it to
several later occasions during which he was seen shedding
tears in public. However, it is usually the newsworthiness of an
event that trumps (pun inevitable) any such speculations. The fact that Donald Trump’s campaign often seems to be
less reliant on a coherent action plan than on his ability to tap into American voters’ ids, also points to the fact that
spectacles do not need to rely on terribly intricate strategies, their crudeness instead lending them further appeal.
Populist rhetoric and identification
It has also been observed that Putinism lacks a series of coherent signifiers that could enable the production of a
more rigorous set of tenets to form or produce its ideology. It relies on the figure of Putin – a figure that is itself
‘empty’, consisting of a series of attributes that are modified to adapt to changing times. Elements of Putinism have
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ranged from imperial notions of all-Russian greatness which hark back both to pre-revolutionary Russia as well as to
Cold War rhetoric, to authoritarianism as well as to elements of Western-style democracy; from regret and nostalgia
for the Soviet Union to an endorsement of neoliberal forms of capitalism. Similarly, Trump’s eclectic agenda ranges
from virulent anti-immigration legislation to drug legalisation, and from defunding Planned Parenthood to decreasing
taxes for low-income families. In the eyes of some commenters, a strong leader such as Putin is, in its very
idiosyncrasy, seen as the only potential figure capable of suturing this incoherent ideological field. Indeed, his larger
than life-public persona resonates strongly with the figure of the ‘charismatic leader’ and his ability to mobilise
mechanisms of identification as described by Sigmund Freud in his Group Psychology.
Journalist Peter Pomerantsev has claimed that the Kremlin’s ultimate ideology is that of cynicism, or postmodernism
incarnated in a political project. He characterises this as a deliberate “strategy of power based on keeping any
opposition there may be constantly confused, a ceaseless shape-shifting that is unstoppable because it’s
indefinable”. However, this obliqueness has also been interpreted in somewhat less Machiavellian terms by some
commentators, who feel that Putin acts as “a mirror in which everyone, whether communist or democrat, sees what
he wants and hopes to see”. Others that “Putin stands in for the void in an attempt to conceal the non-identity of the
postcommunist order”, that, “if Putinism can be assigned anything like a set of determinate predicates, it could be
summed up in terms of an unlimited valorization of capitalism” (ibid.).
However, Putin has also been described as a populist leader – another feature he is seen to share with figures like
Silvio Berlusconi. Examples of his forays into obscene and vulgar language include the promise to ‘finish (Chechen)
terrorists in the crapper’ in his days as Prime Minister, to a more recent instance, again evoking unorthodox ways of
punishing Chechen rebel fighters:
When, a couple of years ago, a Western journalist asked him an awkward question about Chechnya,
Putin snapped back that, if the man wasn’t yet circumcised, he was cordially invited to Moscow,
where they have excellent surgeons who would cut a little more radically than usual. (Žižek, 2009)
These outbursts – recruiting the Russian ‘national other’ of the Muslim separatist, and combining it with sadistic and
darkly sexual imagery – occur very sporadically, but always attract media attention – the other type of incident being
that of Putin publicly telling risqué jokes. While the presence of such rhetoric may be partially related to past violence
that has remained unexorcised from contemporary Russian discourses, it sometimes appears to be employed with
strategic intent. But why would the Russian president need this ‘obscene supplement’ to his speech? And again
extending the obvious comparison, why have Trump’s forays into the crass and the obscene seen such positive
resonance among many Americans? The presidential candidate is notoriously thin-skinned, but even his public
obsession with the perceived size of hands and what this might imply has receives less negative attention among
his supporters than expected.
One explanation sees the deployment of populist rhetoric as a way of strengthening bonds with the community; that
it is in fact tailored to appeal specifically to its ‘ordinary’ members, “prepared in advance in conformity with the
Russian ‘national character’”, Žižek notes. In the case of Putinism, however, and in contrast with Ernesto Laclau’s
more optimistic take on the phenomenon of populism as serving to create new political identities, the President’s
tightly choreographed publicity stunts and linguistic ‘mishaps’ in fact serve to encourage a move away from politics,
as a way of continuing and maintaining the late Soviet period. Populism can attach itself to any number of demands
– in fact its reliance on ‘empty signifiers’ is one of Laclau’s core assumptions, but in Putinism, this demand emanates
from the presidential administration itself, and represents an attempt to discourage political participation and
potential dissent. Thought of in this vein, the potpourri of values drawn upon by Putin and his administration is not
intended to represent a coherent set of tenets, but chiefly aims to create an emotional effect, discouraging further
analysis, which is easily achieved in a rhetorical move such as that of enunciating what cannot be said, in a manner
that is normally taboo in political discourse.
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Russian observers have noted that Putin’s regime is in fact becoming more openly populist with time, following a
disenchantment with the elites that Putin was previously able to rely on. First indicators were an increased recourse
to Soviet symbolry, by which he is seen to be appealing to those that hanker after the ‘glory days of yonder’ – those
citizens who had lost the most with the breakup of the Soviet Union. In Perry Anderson’s words, “the losers below,
‘the silent majority of Russians’, who are ‘mostly atomised, middle-aged individuals, beaten-down, unheroic
philistines trying to make ends meet as decently as they can’, after twenty years of betrayed expectations.” This
again echoes in interesting ways with how the Trump campaign has instrumentalised the disappointments of what is
often portrayed as the white working- and middle-class losers of globalisation, even though some would argue that
“their grievances were more theoretical than actual, more media-induced than experience-related”.
According to Slavoj Žižek, “the popular movement needs the identificatory figure of a charismatic leader”. However,
if all of a ‘popular movement’s’ coherence and content are provided by its leader figure, then this also proves to be
its weakest point. Putin may be the ‘master signifier’ that brings together the disparate, at times haphazard elements
of Russianness and fuses them into the (non)ideology of Putinism, but a potential public rejection of Putin then also
leads to the disintegration of this vision. Similarly, the distancing by many republicans from Trump’s candidacy show
the lack of support ‘Trumpism’ experiences from established political figures even within his own party. Besides the
construction of the infamous wall between the US and Mexico and his demand to have Hillary Clinton imprisoned,
his populist melange of ideas and slogans are given only a semblance of coherence by Trump’s persona. However,
the centrality of his supposed integrity and prowess also make his campaign singularly lopsided. With everything
intentionally hinging on the figure of the President, a turn to theories of identification therefore seems apt.
“A composite of King-Kong and the suburban barber”
Taking as its starting point the Freudian account of identification and its role in group formation and –coherence,
Laclau goes on to assert that a leaderless society is in fact impossible; a conclusion echoed by Žižek’s earlier
comment. At the same time, Laclau notes, a group or community cannot sustain its existence through leader-love
alone: “a durable group whose only libidinal tie is love for the leader, is equally impossible”. The leader needs to find
ways of appealing to the group that will put him both in charge and in the midst of its members, so as to be both of
and above them. How might one understand this dual identity? In Laclau’s words, “his identity is split: he is the
father, but also one of the brothers”. One easy manifestation of this is the (usually) red baseball cap Donald Trump
wears at his rallies:
With his red cap on, the glossy billionaire living in a gilt Manhattan apartment appears to have
something in common with the rest of the country, who wear caps when they’re actually at baseball
games, when they’re driving tractors through wheat fields, when they’re barbecuing in their
backyards. And maybe because he looks so ridiculous in it, Trump’s hat is something of an equaliser.
(Eggers, 2016)
In Laclau’s take, group membership makes the leader accountable to the community, so that identification in facts
suppresses authoritarian impulses and creates “a far more democratic leadership than the one involved in the notion
of the narcissistic despot”. Theodor W. Adorno, too, argues that the bond underlying group identification centres
around the figure of the leader, but rather than seeking to exonerate the populist leader from the accusation of
despotism, his focus is on the fascist leader. In his analysis, the primary identification with a powerful, authoritarian
father figure that takes place in fascist regimes is linked to a kind of regression or return to more archaic or ‘primitive’
state. The paternal leader figure here resembles the primal father for whose murder the ‘primal horde’ is then forever
trying to make amends. The group members’ commonalities with the leader then do not serve to quell the dictatorial
tendencies in him – they are merely evidence of the narcissistic aspects of group identification: “While appearing as
a superman, the leader must at the same time work the miracle of appearing as an average person, just as Hitler
posed as a composite of King-Kong and the suburban barber”. In fact, a highlighting of the leader’s heroic,
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superhuman qualities can therefore never fully bypass the rivalrous aspects of identification: “for the sake of those
parts of the follower’s narcissistic libido which have not been thrown into the leader image but remain attached to the
follower’s own ego, the superman must still resemble the follower and appear as his “enlargement””. Roland
Barthes’ analysis of the techniques employed to secure voter appeal in electoral photography confirms as much: the
politician needs to be both familiar, and “exalted, superbly elevated”. Nevertheless the leader figure, in Adorno’s
analysis, is not impervious to historical contingency: while the authoritarian element may be more pronounced under
fascism, it decreases in importance in a less repressive society. What remains is the need to convey an “impression
of greater force and of more freedom of libido” than the rest of the community.
Thought of in terms of theories of identification, a somewhat exaggerated identity therefore becomes necessary if
the leader is to be accepted as such. However, the amalgam of ordinary and extraordinary components needs to be
prepared carefully to suit current national tastes, as these tastes are subject to change. The constant attempts by
Putin and his advisors to present new impressive facets of his persona implicitly demonstrate an understanding of
this fact. However, they also give evidence of how much the President continues to search for means to secure his
appeal. Similarly, the changes that Trump’s campaign team has undergone recently demonstrate that, despite an
instinctive grasp of how to attract attention and popularity, he is still looking for means to secure a broader, more
stable support base.
In the case of Russia, it appears that a classical panacea to this dilemma has been found. To achieve this, the
government relies less on the President as sole master signifier, and more on ways of turning Russia’s inherent
tensions outward. Indeed, the surge of patriotism that followed the annexation of Crimea and subsequent armed
conflict in Ukraine may have secured Putin’s reign for another term. The newly drafted social contract no longer
merely agrees to provide relative economic stability to enable consumption for obedient, apolitical subjects. Rather,
it gratifies the longing for moments of national greatness and unity by literalising the notion of a “theft of enjoyment”:
the beautiful peninsula that assumes such a symbolic place in Russian national imagination had been ‘given away’
by Khrushchev in 1954, only to be returned to its rightful owners – the Russian people – by Putin’s government in
2014. Lev Gudkov, together with colleagues from Levada-Center, illustrates how the antagonisms of Russian
society have been effectively channelled in a process of ‘negative mobilization’, whereby dissenters of that vision
are branded as traitors, and members of the opposition press designated as belonging to the ‘5th column’.
The ways in which the Trump campaign has similarly relied on nationalistic ideas – chiefly through a vilification of
immigrants and the prelapsarian idea of ‘making America great again’ – as well as the schizophrenic relationship it
maintains with the media, simultaneously accusing it of lying while also relying on it to gain as much publicity as
possible, demonstrates that the primer on how to win followers and influence people relies on certain perennial and
transnational principles, such as the ones discussed in this essay. These include a presence both above and among
one’s eclectorate, by combining superiority – be it physical or psychological – with the right amount of populist
rhetoric or folksy demeanour. Internal tensions are best channelled outward, or in the direction of select minority
groups. Originality is no strong requirement. In fact, relying on existing symbols and narratives is a plus as they
enhance recognisability and serve to produce comfortable and comforting nostalgia. A coherent political agenda is
similarly optional – personal charisma will most likely outshine sensible policies. Most importantly, the power of
spectacle and especially of the well-managed photo opportunity are to assume a central place in one’s political
toolbox.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the
London School of Economics. It is re-posted with kind permission from The Disorder of Things.
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